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FOREWORD
For most military analysts, the term “deterrence”
brings to mind the notion of nuclear deterrence. We
think of how two opposing states attempt to deter
their adversaries through creating a balance of weapons, telegraphing their intentions, and establishing
themselves as a credible threat. We think of the Cold
War, and the standoff between the Soviet Union and
the United States.
However, in this Letort Paper, Dr. Mary Manjikian raises the intriguing notion that the best analogy
when thinking about cyber-deterrence does not actually come from the nuclear arena but rather from the
literature about border controls. Drawing on a rich
literature, including case studies of successful and unsuccessful attempts at securing the Southern border
of the United States, she demonstrates that the approaches, strategies, and costs of carrying out physical border defense and virtual border defense have
many similarities. First, Dr. Manjikian argues that the
actors we most need to deter in cyberspace are often
not states but rather may include a broad coalition of
threats—including insiders, state and nonstate actors,
and members of a criminal element. Just as is the case
when we consider our physical borders, not everyone who attempts to traverse our virtual borders uses
the same methods, nor do they have the same intentions. Thus, differentiated deterrence strategies can
be framed and used, depending on the nature of the
threat and the adversary’s intentions.
Furthermore, Dr. Manjikian argues that in cyberdeterrence, there is no clear moment of a “standoff”
between two opposing sides—as we often see in the
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nuclear arena. Instead, the actions taken by those attempting to defend borders in cyberspace and those
who attempt to trespass them are ongoing.
In addition, just as is the case in real space-border
incursions, over time trespassers learn more about
their adversaries’ defenses. Each time they make an
incursion across the border they gain new information
about how resources are organized, where they are
deployed, and where the weak points in our defense
are. Thus, each incursion—even when unsuccessful—
ups the chances that the next incursion will succeed.
Moreover, the costs of defense often are significantly
greater than the costs of mounting another incursion.
Over time, the trespasser’s costs may decrease, while
the defender’s costs remain constant.
Perhaps most significantly, Dr. Manjikian explains
why disparate elements who share a border will not
always work together to defend that border. In considering physical borders, building a wall or setting up
a checkpoint in one location may simply cause those
seeking entry to move on to consider a different entry
point, which is not as well defended. Similarly, both
corporations and agencies may unwittingly create
security threats for other agencies or corporate rivals
through adopting a more stringent defense of their own
borders.
This analysis raises interesting questions and will
give readers much to consider in thinking through the
issue of cyber-deterrence today. This novel approach
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will also, I hope, lead to the creation of novel solutions
as we address the growing threat of cybertrespass
today.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
In recent years, analysts have begun discussing
strategies for securing entities in cyberspace—including the files and software belonging to corporations,
government institutions, and private individuals.
Increasingly, analysts have suggested utilizing two
types of deterrence strategies: deterrence by denial
and deterrence by punishment. In determining how
both deterrence strategies might be applied to preventing hostile individuals, states, and nonstate actors from entering cyberspace and inflicting damage
there, analysts have borrowed from deterrence strategies that have been framed for a variety of other situations. While the tendency among members of the
military community is to look to other military situations—such as nuclear war, or the use of biological
or chemical weapons—in which deterrence strategies
may have been used, it is my contention that these
scenarios are not necessarily the best fit for describing
what happens in cyberspace. Rather, my intent in this
Letort Paper is to look at other literature that refers to
deterrence strategies—namely, criminology literature,
which looks at strategies and tactics for deterring illegal immigration.
In the first section of this Letort Paper, three
possible strategies for responding to criminal behavior as presented in the criminology literature
are described, including: prevention by design;
deterrence by denial; and deterrence by punishment. Moreover, this Letort Paper suggests that
cyber-deterrent strategies are more properly categorized as prevention by design strategies rather than
deterrence by denial strategies, and the difference
between the two is explained.
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The second section points to existing problems of
applying the theories regarding nuclear deterrence to
the cyberconflict situation—focusing in particular on
the knowledge problem (the problem of attribution)
and the temporal problem (the ways in which time
functions in cyberspace), both of which are spelled out
in greater detail in that section.
The third section explains what can be learned
from the criminology example of providing border
security. In the border security case, we are able to see
how different types of would-be aggressors are approached differently, how targeted strategies are created, and how border security is an issue that needs to
be handled in association with related issues, including economic ones. Then, the section examines the
ways in which the United States has been able to work
with its neighbors in creating border security.
Finally, the concluding section of this Letort Paper
draws on the border security example to develop lessons for the provision of cybersecurity.
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DETERRING CYBERTRESPASS AND SECURING
CYBERSPACE: LESSONS FROM UNITED STATES
BORDER CONTROL STRATEGIES
I. THREE TYPES OF CRIMINAL DETERRENT
STRATEGIES: PREVENTION BY DESIGN;
DETERRENCE BY DENIAL; AND DETERRENCE
BY PUNISHMENT
As noted, the concept of deterrence does not belong solely to military and strategic studies scholars.
Indeed, there is an equally broad literature about deterrence within the fields of criminology and even the
health sciences. In those contexts, analysts consider
the ways in which individuals and sometimes groups
may be induced to alter or desist in their harmful behaviors through a combination of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment strategies. Analysts have asked how individuals and groups may be
deterred from engaging in activities such as driving
while intoxicated,1 dealing in illegal drugs,2 or battering their spouse or significant other.3
The criminological model of deterrence and the
work done by academic criminologists on practices
of deterring offenders provide many useful lessons
for those interested in understanding more about the
ways deterrence can and does work in cyberspace.
As Lynn Zimmer suggests in her work on deterring
drug trafficking in American cities, criminal deterrence strategies ideally seek to accomplish two goals.
The first is that they are concerned with capturing and
sometimes preempting offenders to make sure that
they do not offend and re-offend. However, deterrence
strategies are also important for creating order within
a region or a neighborhood. By “cracking down” on
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those who seek to engage in activities that are violent
and disruptive to the community as a whole, a collective good—stability and peace—is distributed to the
entire community.4 This same pattern holds true in
cyberspace: U.S. cyber-deterrence initiatives, as well
as those deterrence initiatives carried out by other
states and even corporations within cyberspace, seek
to preempt or prevent the carrying out of costly, dangerous, and disruptive attacks against government
and civilian critical infrastructure. However, these
deterrence initiatives also seek to preserve the peace,
stability, and order of cyberspace so that the benefits
of the Internet may be enjoyed by all citizens.5 That
is, criminological literature explicitly acknowledges
the fact that deterrence is not simply an elite strategy,
practiced by elites and affecting only elites within the
system. Rather, deterrence is a way of securing space
for all citizens within the community.
In addition, the criminology literature—particularly the literature about illegal immigration—focuses
on the actors involved in these activities. As Frank
Cilluffo et al. noted, the nuclear deterrence analogy
might not be a good fit with the cyber-deterrence
puzzle because its overwhelming focus is on hardware—the weapons that are used to demonstrate
resolve. However, Cilluffo et al. argued that the real
threat in cyberspace comes not from the code itself,
but rather from the individuals and groups (including criminal elements, state-sponsored terrorists, and
foreign militaries) who seek to use code and computer
exploits (actions that take advantage of a computer
bug or vulnerability) to enter and destroy parts of cyberspace. Thus, they argue, the key to defeating these
intrusions lies not in focusing on weapons but on the
individuals and groups who use them—through a
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better understanding of their motivations, views, and
conceptualizations of risk and threat.6 It therefore may
be more useful to ask: “How do deterrence strategies
prevent individuals from driving while intoxicated,
from engaging in domestic violence, or from engaging
in illegal immigration—and what can we learn from
these situations that is relevant to the best ways to deter cyber-intruders rather than to dwell at length on
specific technological specifications and their effects
on driving or ending the cyber-arms race?”
In addition, the literature on deterring criminal behavior does not assume—as nuclear deterrence writing does—that motives are unalterable and incapable
of being changed. Looking predominantly at individual law-breaking behavior, this literature pays more
attention to the way individuals make choices to engage in behavior the authorities wish to deter, as well
as the circumstances that might create these behaviors
to begin with. For example, a study of driving while
intoxicated does not consider merely what remedies
are most effective in reducing or deterring the behavior, but may also engage with the “why questions”—
the reasons some deterrent strategies work better than
others. Another “why question” could be the degree
to which a penalty for drunk driving might lead to a
cessation of the behavior, rather than merely a decision to engage in the behavior in another state where
perhaps penalties are less strict. That is, the strategy
does not take preferences as given, but also asks how
preferences might be changed.7
Furthermore, the criminological literature on deterrence is in some ways much richer than that about
nuclear deterrence, which cyber-analysts have thus
far devoted the bulk of their attention to. Because
there are so many instances of crimes, such as illegal
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immigration, drug trafficking, or driving under the influence—and so few cases of nuclear launches—there
are a much wider variety of cases of both successful
and failed deterrence efforts for analysts to examine.
Because the emphasis is on understanding a mass
rather than an elite phenomenon, we have the opportunity to use methodologies to study the problem
that would not be available in studying nuclear deterrence, for example. In particular, as this Letort Paper
indicates, there are numerous studies of illegal immigration based on survey data and interviews collected
from both failed and successful illegal immigrants.
This data allows us to speak at greater length about
the individual psychological decision-making processes, which individuals undergo in reacting to a deterrent, as well as to understand better which types of
deterrents are more or less successful in preventing an
attack. The criminology literature is also much more
explicit about the end goals sought in utilizing deterrence strategies. Analysts ask, “Do we want to reform
the criminal, to cause him not to engage in criminal
behavior anymore, or merely prevent him from robbing my house?” In each case, the action is deterred,
but the result is somewhat different, not only for the
person implementing the strategies but for his or her
neighbors as well.
What Can Studies of Drunk Drivers Teach Us
About Cyber-Deterrence?
Valid lessons can be culled from examining surveys of would-be immigrants in particular to help
us understand how potential cyber-aggressors think
about issues, including strategy, tactics, targeting, and
the likelihood of success and failure. In presenting
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both nuclear deterrent and criminal deterrent strategies, analysts rely on certain assumptions about how
individuals make decisions, based on the notion of the
rational actor. In each case, analysts assume that the
actor who is deciding whether to act is aware of his
or her preferences; that he or she is able to state those
preferences and to rank-order them; and that he or
she is aware of the costs and benefits (the utility) associated with these preferences. Models also assume
that deterrence strategies can be effective in changing
the actions of individuals and groups, and that outside analysts are able to interpolate the actors’ preferences to assign value to and rank them and to rank
the preferred options and outcomes of each side in the
conflict.
Within criminology literature, analysts distinguish
between not two but three different types of deterrent
strategies. The first is deterrence, or prevention by
design. In these cases, analysts may assume that the
behavior they are trying to prevent is not ultimately
preventable, because of human nature, social practices, or another variable. In such cases, a decision is
made that it is not cost-effective—or perhaps not even
possible—to seek to change individual’s preferences
and practices. Therefore, officials may decide not to
spend time and money on convincing individuals not
to deface public property, not to engage in prostitution,
or not to text and drive. Instead, they may work with
designers, architects, or even medical personnel to put
measures in place that make the individual unable to
engage in his or her desired action regardless of his or
her preferences. Design modifications—or barriers—
might include requiring sex offenders to take medication that makes sexual activity impossible; developing special repellent paints to use in public places that
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make producing graffiti impossible; or constructing
a physical structural wall between bordering nations
to make illegal immigration impossible. 8 Indeed, the
design of many computer firewalls is properly understood as a form of prevention by design.
Although such designs may be highly effective, it
is worth noting that adopting such strategies has its
limitations, since it does not actually change the preference structure of the would-be offender, nor does
it establish community norms against the behavior.
Instead, prevention by design strategies often merely
stem a particular set of behaviors at a particular geographic location. However, since the strategies do not
change preferences, it is likely that the would-be offenders will simply move on to perform the undesirable behavior at a different location. For example, a
business that plays old-fashioned music to discourage
teens from loitering outside the establishment has not
actually solved the problem of loitering but has only
encouraged the teens to move on to a different location or target.
In addition, prevention by design can be seen as
a dynamic process. It is unlikely that the “architects”
of this policy will ever arrive at a perfect solution that
prevents all of the unwanted behaviors. Instead, one
can envision a scenario in which would-be rule violators design a work-around to lessen the effects of the
prevention by design measure. (For example, undocumented immigrants wishing to enter the United States
but encountering a border fence might choose another
location to make their entrance attempt, or they might
hire a more experienced guide to assist them in their
efforts.) Thus, any investment in prevention by design
is likely to be temporary or of limited value. It is not
a permanent solution. This understanding presents a
dilemma—since the creation of a prevention by design
6

strategy may necessitate a long-term investment by
an actor to secure what is perhaps only a short-term
advantage.
Here, the lesson for cybersecurity is clear as well.
Barriers that prevent actors from accessing a system
need to be, as Emilio Iasiello notes, “relentlessly monitored and adapted to a constantly changing threat environment.”9 Here we can consider events in 2014 and
2015, in which much of the energy in cyber-defense
and cyber-deterrence was aimed at improving the
security of major corporations (like those associated
with credit cards and the financial system), which
succeeded only in leaving additional vulnerabilities
open, such as the possibility that hackers would then
target the healthcare industry.
Prevention by design strategies are also unusual in
that they are most often “one size fits all.” strategy. It
is harder to come up with a targeted prevention by
design strategy, since most often design modifications
will prevent all affected actors from engaging in the
action in all situations, rather than merely preventing
some individuals in some situations. For example, a
municipality that designs a town square without seating in order to prevent homeless individuals from
taking up residence in the square will not succeed in
preventing only this action. Rather, it is just as likely
that the disabled or elderly visitor to the square will
also have nowhere to sit. (Similarly, an Internet filter
meant to prevent schoolchildren from accessing sexual content might also affect the adults working at the
school, preventing them from, for example, preparing
a biology lesson.) Prevention by design strategies are,
in this regard, crude but highly effective strategies.
Table 1 illustrates how prevention by design strategies work in three areas—criminology, law enforcement, and cybersecurity.
7

Field

Criminology:

Action

Driving While
Intoxicated

Prevent by
Design Strategy

Possible
Outcomes

Install devices
like breathalyzers
in cars to prevent
individuals from
driving while
drunk

Individual may
decide not to drive
while drunk, OR
he may procure
another vehicle

Law
Enforcement:

Install fences
Overcoming
along U.S.
Border Security
southern border

Individual may
decide not to
immigrate, or may
continue to make
repeated attempts,
often at other
locations

Cybersecurity:

Unauthorized
Access to
systems

Individual may
decide not to
access and may
move on, choosing
a different target

Use of firewalls

Table 1. Prevention by Design Strategies.
Writing about cyber-deterrence frequently conflates together the notion of prevention by design and
deterrence by denial, since this distinction is not as
clear in the international relations literature as it is in
the criminology literature. In particular, proponents
of cyber-deterrent strategies may speak of raising the
costs of attack, stating that an adversary may preemptively decide not to attack a target because the perceived costs of attack are too high due to the information available about the barriers that must be accessed
surrounding the target. Thus, they draw on the writings of the military strategist Sun Tzu, who suggested
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that the best conflict is the one you are never forced to
fight because your opponent is intimidated and withdraws before war is declared.
In point of fact, one can raise the costs of an attack
either through design modifications—such as a border fence, which would be expensive to scale without
elaborate equipment or outside help—or through a
deterrence by denial strategy, such as export controls,
which would make it difficult for an adversary to assemble the necessary components to carry out an attack. Here, deterrence by denial refers to the creation
of barriers to entry, which would raise the costs and
level of difficulty experienced by would-be hackers
seeking to access information or assets through cyberspace. In such a circumstance, the expectation is
either that the would-be attackers would fail in their
attempts, or that they would preemptively decide not
to attack, based on what they know about their odds
of success and failure. (That is, their preferences might
actually be changed.)
For example, an opponent who contemplates assembling a nuclear weapon might be prevented
from doing so through a concerted effort by all nations within the international community not to allow
rogue nations to buy enriched uranium or acquire the
laboratory equipment and technical expertise needed.
Here, a multilateral combination of monitoring, export controls, and intelligence activities is used together to deny the adversary access to the necessary
components. Deterrence by denial strategies may thus
rest on a strategy of publicity in which would-be attackers or lawbreakers are made aware in advance of
the barriers to their access, or they may be carried out
covertly, with would-be attackers becoming aware of
the barriers only when they encounter them through
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actions. Braun and Chyba (2004) refer to such a regime
as a “supply side strategy,” since the aim is to keep
would-be aggressors from procuring the necessary
supplies to carry out their attacks.10 Similarly, Barnum
distinguishes between “inward-looking strategies,”
which ask the defender to consider what his or her
own weaknesses or points of vulnerability might be,
and “outward-looking strategies,” which might consider the resources that the community as a whole has
to defeat the aggressor.11
While the two strategies—prevention by design
and deterrence by denial—might look similar on the
surface, they are not in fact the same strategy. Both
are strategies that require planning and intelligence.
Those who seek to prevent an action or deny an adversary are in both cases acting on information they
already have on what the adversary is likely to do.
In this way, both strategies are proactive, rather than
reactive.12 However, prevention through design is a
unilateral strategy that any individual player could
mount. It does not require any outside cooperation to
work, nor does it create any form of community good.
In contrast, deterrence through denial may be carried
out either unilaterally or multilaterally.13 In a multilateral deterrence strategy, the actors wishing to deter an
action may cooperate to establish a regime in order to
create a community good (such as international security). A multilateral strategy would require a “buy-in”
from other actors within a neighborhood or international community.
Analysts also differ as to whether deterrence by
denial strategies are effective in changing the preferences of the would-be aggressor. In criminology terms,
consider a strategy aimed to deter underage drinking through requiring proper identification for those

10

wishing to enter an establishment serving or selling
alcohol (deterrence by denial), as well as through punishing those caught with illegal possession of alcohol
(deterrence by punishment). It is possible that requiring proper identification would deter some individuals who sought illegal access to alcohol, while others
might go around the prohibition by procuring a false
identification card.14
Also, consider the example of international export
control regimes aimed at deterring rogue states and
nonstate actors from securing access to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. While some actors might
be deterred by the difficulties erected through such regimes, others might be more persistent—and instead
of abandoning the quest, they might turn to other
suppliers for the needed ingredients. Alternately, they
might choose another tactic for launching their attack,
such as, for example, a suicide attack over a biological
weapons attack.
It is my contention that in discussing cybersecurity
initiatives, many examples of prevention through design approaches have actually been mislabeled as deterrence by denial. While it is true that today the United States is involved in multilateral efforts to secure
cyberspace and to deter aggressors, it is equally true
that corporations overwhelmingly provide only for
their own cybersecurity and that they are reluctant to
provide information about either the attacks that they
have undergone or those that they have prevented in
the larger community. The majority of cybersecurity
initiatives today—particularly those undertaken by
corporate actors—are unilateral, aimed not at securing a public good, such as a more secure cyberspace,
but rather, securing the “borders” of particular corporations, even if doing so means increasing the likeli-
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hood that the same actor might target another American entity. In each case, the aim of the protector is not
to change the strategy or practices of the aggressor,
but instead, merely to prevent incursion into one’s
own system. In Realist terms, one could argue that
prevention by design is a selfish strategy, in which an
organization prioritizes its own survival over that of
the collective. A graphic example of this strategy in
practice would be a situation in which New Mexico,
for example, became a stringent enforcer of border security, thus leading to more individuals attempting to
cross the border into California.15
SUGGESTIONS FOR PLANNERS
In considering how organizations such as U.S. Cyber Command might work with corporations to prevent unauthorized access to both corporate information and specifically, customer information belonging
to U.S. citizens, it is thus important to consider the
difference between the two strategies—prevention by
design versus deterrence by denial. One can draw the
following lessons from looking at prevention by design strategies:
• Do not assume that attackers will eventually “learn” anything, including the futility of
mounting future attacks.
• Do not expect that any form of community or
shared interests would evolve among organizations predominantly utilizing a prevention
by design approach.
• When one player increases its prevention by
design level, the costs may be passed on to other organizations, which now become more attractive targets. The “arms race” created is thus
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not between the attacker and the target, but between multiple targets, each of whom wants to
be seen as the least desirable, most difficult, or
most expensive site for attack.16
• Cyber-deterrent barriers need to be dynamic.
The dilemma is that a long-term investment
may be required to produce only a short-term
advantage.
Table 2 illustrates differences between prevention by
design and deterrence by denial.
Prevention by Design

Deterrence via Denial

Goal:

Raise costs, barriers to attack

Raise costs, barriers to
attack

Actors:

Individual (corporation,
municipality, etc.)

Individual or Community

Goods Created:

Individual Goods

Individual or Community
Goods

Who Is Deterred?

Everyone

The least persistent actors

Desired Actions:

Attacker will decide not to
Attacker will choose new target attack or choose new target
or strategy

Table 2. Prevention by Design vs. Deterrence
by Denial.
The final deterrent strategy that criminologists refer to in their work is deterrence by punishment. This
term refers to strategies that would be implemented
to punish individuals and groups, and in some cases,
their sponsors (including state sponsors), once access
has been detected and, in some cases, damage has
been sustained. While both prevention by design and
deterrence by denial are proactive strategies aimed
at preventing a breach from occurring, deterrence by
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punishment refers to actions taken after a breach has
occurred. However, one can also deter based on a
threat of punishment—in essence effecting the calculations that the would-be attacker carries out before
deciding not to attack based on the likely punishment
for doing so. That is, one can preempt conflict through
the creation of an expectation that the punishment received for one’s attempt is far greater than any gain
one could possibly expect to receive through that
attempt.
Here, criminologists and military thinkers part
ways in their analysis of deterrence by punishment.
Theorists within military ethics and international
law are particularly preoccupied with the size of the
threatened punishment, which is threatened, and they
have argued about whether deterrence by punishment
necessarily rests on a use of disproportionate force in
relation to the action itself—a situation that would
seem to violate the international law principle of
proportionality.17 In addition, analysts who write
about nuclear deterrence speak of a punisher’s resolve and credibility: consider, for example, whether
the Soviet Union really believed that the United States
would be willing to inflict a nuclear strike during the
Cold War era.
In contrast, criminologists have focused on the
deterrent effects of punishment, focusing not on the
punishment itself but on the way the would-be aggressor understands that punishment. They have
asked whether young miscreants are sufficiently well
informed about the punishment they are likely to receive, and how clearly the signal regarding their likely
punishment has been received. Findings of a study
about drinking and driving among college students
found that the best predictors of an effective deter-
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rence by punishment strategy were the “celerity”
and imminence of the threatened punishment along
with the certainty and severity of that punishment.
The same study found that individuals might be as
affected by the extra-legal consequences of a punishment as they are by the legal ones.18 Here again the
criminology literature is more nuanced, distinguishing between serial recidivists and one-time offenders.
In this way, the criminology literature enables us to
examine situations of iterated deterrence, which have
not merely one deterrent event but several. As argued
in Section II of this Letort Paper, the iterative nature
of cyberattacks is one key feature that distinguishes
cyber-conflict from more traditional military conflict,
including nuclear conflict.
II. WHY THE NUCLEAR ANALOGY IS A BAD FIT
As noted, most queries regarding how deterrence
might be applied in cyberspace thus far have been
based on an analysis of the literature on nuclear deterrence.19 Analysts have asked whether it might be
possible to draw a “red line” in cyberspace, or set up
conditions under which aggressors would become
aware that their actions were subject to deterrence
by punishment.20 They have also described the ways
in which the “battlespace” has been secured through
the use of nuclear weapons, and asked whether cyberweapons, along with more conventional weapons,
could not play a similar role in defending the cyberbattlespace.21 Parallels are frequently drawn between
the mutually assured destruction (MAD), which
would be created if both sides were to use nuclear
weapons in a bilateral conflict during the Cold War,
and that MAD might occur today in cyberspace if
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deterrence measures were to fail.22 In his essay, “Cyber Deterrence: Is a Deterrence Model Practical in Cyberspace,” Nathaniel Youd again considers the nuclear-cyberwarfare parallel in suggesting that while the
threat of MAD may have been the impetus for later
attempts at nuclear disarmament, such an event is unlikely with reference to cyberwarfare.23
However, applying the literature on nuclear deterrence to the evolving situation in cyberspace is not
a perfect fit—for several reasons. In the next section
of this Letort Paper, several specific problems, which
help to distinguish deterrence in cyberspace from deterrence in the nuclear arena, are considered. These
issues include the knowledge problem or the problem
of attribution; the temporal problem, or the ways in
which time functions in cyberspace as opposed to during nuclear attacks; the payoff or reward structure for
both types of events; and the fact that nuclear deterrence was largely an elite activity carried out by specialists, whereas cyber-deterrence is a populist activity that includes several different types of actors and
in which publicity, declaratory policy, and signaling
become increasingly important throughout the interactions. Table 3 provides a brief summary of these
differences in approach.
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Nuclear Deterrence
• Actors are specified.
Attribution/
knowledge

• Both sides have information about adversary’s weapons, strategies, and values.

Cyber-Deterrence
• Actors are initially unspecified,
becoming clearer as the interaction
proceeds.
• All actors must speculate about
others’ motives, weapons, strategies, and values.
• Interactions are iterated.

Temporal
frame

• Interactions are not
connected. Success
in one interaction may
not affect capabilities
or chance of success in
future interactions.
• Interaction produces a
clear winner and loser.

Payoff
structure

• Action is zero-sum (one
side wins while other
loses through backing
down, or failing to demonstrate resolve).
• Actions, weapons, and
strategies are classified.
• Cleared individuals who
do not share information
carry out actions and
strategies.

Elite/
populist

• Public may have a stake
in the outcome but does
not have any responsibility to participate or be
informed.
Demonstrate
resolve/
capability

• Signaling function may
be clear-cut.

• As they proceed, both sides acquire more information.
• Later interactions may not resemble earlier interactions as strategy,
resolve, knowledge, and capabilities evolve.
• Iterated nature means that even
the loser gains: He acquires more
knowledge about his adversary,
which is used against the adversary in a future interaction.
• Attacker may gain credibility or
fame through launching an attack,
even if he fails.
• Actions, weapons, and strategies
may be the subject of public knowledge and speculation.
• Individuals, groups, corporations,
and state actors carry out actions.
• Corporate employees and citizens
may be called upon to “help” in
cyber-deterrence effort through
practicing good cyber-hygiene and
reporting suspected attacks.
• Signaling function is frequently
unclear.

Table 3. Differences between Nuclear Deterrence
and Cyber-Deterrence.
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The Knowledge Problem: Attribution,
Puzzles, and Mysteries.
As noted earlier, nuclear deterrence literature relies on a game theory model in which there are clear
policy consequences associated with each of the clearly defined choices a state may face. Thus, in describing
and understanding how great powers made decisions
about how to behave during a nuclear standoff, analysts could assume that they knew who their adversary
was, what weapons he or she possessed, the power
associated with those weapons and the consequences
for each side associated with each policy choice. In addition, the field of nuclear forensics made it possible to
identify particular components as belonging to particular actors. In this way, there was a clear trail from the
attack back to the attacker.24 In addition, nuclear deterrence is zero-sum, meaning that in each altercation,
one side could be said to have succeeded while the
other failed. It was quite obvious in a nuclear standoff
who the winner and loser were. Finally, it is obvious
what constitutes an act of war in nuclear war: it is the
launch of a missile. In contrast, it is not entirely clear
what constitutes an act of war in cyberspace, nor are
the ideas of territory or boundaries clearly defined or
agreed upon within international law.25
In addition, as Robert Jervis points out, nuclear deterrence theory suggests that all actors contemplating
a nuclear attack see the world in similar ways, based
on similar assumptions. Thus, one assumes that they
have similar motives and intents as well as a similar
time frame.26 This set of assumptions may well hold
in considering nuclear deterrence doctrines, but it is
problematic in considering the applicability of these
doctrines to cyberspace. Instead, as Robert Siciliano
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has noted, cyber-incursions into U.S. Government and
private cyber-assets are carried out by a variety of different actors with a variety of different motives. Not all
actors see risk the same way, nor are all equally committed to the achievement of their objectives.27 Indeed,
recent discussions about the problem of asymmetric
warfare in cyberspace are an acknowledgement of this
reality—that deterrence by punishment strategies cannot be “one size fits all”—since not all attackers have
the same critical infrastructure and assets belonging to
their group or state. Therefore, it is not possible for the
United States or another defender to strike back at a
group in the same way in which they themselves may
have been struck.28
However, in thinking about the altercations that
have taken place thus far in cyberspace, one is reminded of the words of the analyst Gregory Treverton
who drew our attention to the differences between
puzzles and mysteries in describing the task of intelligence gatherers today. In his work,29 Treverton
suggests that the task of intelligence during the Cold
War was mostly to “fill in the blanks”—or to provide
answers to clearly specified questions such as, “How
many ICBMs does the Soviet Union have and where
are they stationed?” Once one gathered all these puzzle pieces together, one could have a clear picture of
the battlefield and the risks associated with various
strategies. In contrast, he argues that in the post-Cold
War Era, the questions that confront intelligence planners are not puzzles, but mysteries. The questions are
frequently broader and less clearly specified. They
may include the word “Why” and ask for speculation about motives, which are unclear and sometimes
poorly specified. Thus, a mystery might include a
query like, “Who are our enemies and why do they
wish to harm us?”
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We can compare the knowledge environment of
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to the Spring 2015 cyberattacks on the U.S. Office of Personnel Management,
believed to have been carried out by the Chinese statesponsored group Deep Panda. In recent years, Deep
Panda has attacked American think tanks and human
rights groups, as well as defense, healthcare, government, and technology firms.30 Here, cyberspace attribution is not a one-time process in which one is immediately right or wrong in terms of one’s assessment
of who committed the attack. Instead, as Eric Jensen
notes, attribution may take place along a spectrum
where, “over time a victim becomes more and more
certain of who committed the attack.”31 And here, as
we can see, intelligence plays a much larger role in
helping actors think through and make sense of the
battlespace—helping to see through deceptions, such
as actors who “spoof” or pretend to be other actors,
helping to draw connections between groups who
might not at first glance appear to be connected, and
providing answers to mysteries such as, “Who is my
attacker and what does he want?”
We might also compare the winter 2014-15 attacks
on the Anthem healthcare corporation, which are also
believed to have been the work of Deep Panda. In the
Anthem intrusion, the security firm which investigated the break-in was able to match the Internet Protocol (IP) address associated with the malware to other
known IP addresses associated with Chinese government information warfare divisions32—but this only
occurred after the break-in had been identified. The
two parties thus never came “eye to eye”—since the
American entity did not immediately realize that they
were under attack, nor did they know the identity of
their attackers until much later.
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The Temporal Problem: The Iterative Nature of
Cyber-Defense.
In comparing nuclear and cyber-deterrent environments, one also needs to consider the different temporal environments—or the way in which time factors
into decision-making in each environment. Here, as
Joseph Nye, Jr. points out, “Nuclear explosions are
unambiguous and immediate; cyber-intrusions can
plant logic bombs in the infrastructure that may go
unnoticed for long periods.”33 That is, the temporal
logic for both types of deterrence is different. In the
nuclear example, if a defending state wishes to deter
an attack through a show of force, that show must
take place within a specified period of time in order
to cause an attacker to “back down”—as in the Cuban
Missile Crisis. Academic writing about nuclear deterrence thus often focuses on situations of high conflict34
in which both sides adopt “brinksmanship” strategies. The assumption is that there is one particular
moment when two adversaries come eye to eye with
one another, and in which each side must decide how
to react—whether to launch the nuclear weapon or to
withdraw.35
In contrast, as John Rollins and Clay Wilson note
in their analysis of cyberterrorist attacks, cyberattacks
are frequently not individual, discrete incidents. Instead, as they point out, cyber-incidents tend to blur
the line between war, criminality, and terrorism.36
Thus, the incidents themselves cannot be neatly defined in terms of either their temporal frame or their
effects, which may spill over beyond their original targets. Instead, Rollins and Wilson note that:
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Because of interdependencies among infrastructure
sectors, a large-scale cyberattack that affected one sector could also have disruptive, unpredictable, and perhaps devastating effects on other sectors, and possibly
long-lasting effects to the economy.37

Thus, in contrast to nuclear deterrence, cyber-deterrence is not a process that acts during a specified period of time; rather it is a constant and dynamic process, as attackers may come back again and again to
attempt to access the same site; they may also retreat
from a site and then use information gleaned from the
initial assault to re-enter and wreak more damage at
a later date. Within cyber-politics, such intrusions are
referred to as “advanced persistent threats (APT).”
Dmitri Alperovich describes a scenario involving
cyberthreats as follows:
The adversaries, especially the nation-state types,
don’t consider the battle or their mission to be over
just because they got kicked out of the network. After all, they have a job to do: get in, and stay in no
matter how hard it is or how many roadblocks they
face … And till now, the only way to ‘win’ was to prepare yourself for the long fight with an understanding
that the adversaries won’t relent and you have to be
vigilant and alert to beat back each and every wave of
attack.38

As the National Nuclear Security Administration
notes, the U.S. nuclear security enterprise may experience up to 10 million security events per day, while
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security notes that
tens of thousands of cyber-intrusions are carried out
each year.39 Thus, Iasiello argues that cybersecurity
needs to be both ongoing and dynamic, that while
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one’s enemy may be temporarily deterred from a particular target, this is seldom the end of the matter.40
Furthermore, cyber-deterrence tends to “decay”
over time in a way that nuclear deterrence does not,
since, as Jensen notes, cyberweapons, unlike nuclear
weapons, are “single use” weapons.41 Once a weapon
has been displayed to an adversary and the larger
community, its effectiveness is limited. Others can
easily copy it and modify it, and the developer seldom has a long-term advantage as the creator of the
weapon. As a result, cyber-deterrence strategies are
less likely to end in a stalemate, which creates longterm stability—as the nuclear analogy might suggest.
Instead, adversaries are likely to experience crisis instability, wishing to act quickly after achieving a new
weapon or technology in order to wring all possible
advantages out of that situation before it changes once
again.
However, the most striking difference between
nuclear and cyber-deterrence scenarios is the fact that
cyberattacks or cyber-altercations are seldom a “oneoff” event that is never repeated. Rather, as Brandon
Valeriano and Ryan Maness have shown in their database of cyber-conflict, it is best understood as a set
of iterated or repeated interactions, often among the
same players who spar again and again in cyberspace.
The idea of a stand-off—in the manner of the Cuban
Missile Crisis, between two clearly identified and
known adversaries—is not the most likely scenario to
occur in cyberspace.42 Instead, Valeriano and Maness
suggest that over time, the conflict may heat up, eventually leading to a full-fledged cyberwar, such as what
occurred between Russia and Georgia.43
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The ongoing nature of cyberattack also suggests
that since there is no “brinksmanship moment,” deterrent strategies are also likely to be less effective in
preventing conflict. Within the nuclear arena, we often
speak of a brinksmanship crisis, defined by Richard
Lebow as “a confrontation in which states challenge
important commitments of adversaries in the expectation that the adversaries will back down.”44 That is,
classical deterrence theory is concerned not only with
preventing enemy incursions once they have been
launched or in punishing incursions once they have
occurred (or been detected), but also with the notion
of “winning through intimidation”—of convincing
your enemy that there is no point in attacking you,
since he or she would surely lose, and thus causing
the enemy to change what he or she wants or chooses
to pursue in advance, since there is surely no way to
get it. In the nuclear deterrence literature, the notion
of MAD assumes that within a clearly defined brinksmanship moment, there are payoffs that both sides
would prefer to avoid because their consequences are
unthinkable.45 In this way, the deterrence strategies of
both sides can be understood as a way of preventing
escalation from a conventional to a nuclear arms race,
and on some level, a way of forcing a minimal level
of cooperation, which creates collective goods for the
community as a whole, including stability (bipolarity)
and the absence of nuclear conflict. Nuclear confrontation thus is meant to produce an equilibrium or solution set, which can be reached and will prevent further
escalation and create stability. Here we can consider
the statement by General Bernard Brodie who stated
in 1946: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military
establishment has been to win wars. From now on,
its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have
almost no other useful purpose.”46
24

In considering cyber-deterrent strategies, however, since they lack a brinksmanship moment, it may
be preferable to speak of prevention through design,
rather than deterrence by denial. The image of multiple actors (individuals and groups) relentlessly hammering against the “gates” of an enterprise to seek
entrance seems to have little to do with creating the
conditions under which they change their minds about
entering—as deterrent strategies would suggest—and
more to do with building higher walls, including firewalls, in order to ensure that the target is not overrun. In addition, as noted earlier, would-be intruders
seldom abandon their quest; rather they merely move
on and choose another target, as is common in prevention through design. As a result, deterrent strategies
for cyberspace will need to be long-range targeted,
and carried out within an interagency context.47
Finally, time behaves differently in cyberspace
strategies, since companies today may start with the
assumption the hacking has already occurred and the
hacker is already inside the network. That is, the “conflict” began without the defender being aware of it. As
the defenders respond, they may be said to be “deterring” further actions, but they are clearly not preventing the hackers from entering. Here again, one could
argue that what the defender is really doing is more
akin to prevention through design, as he builds structures (like mazes, hidden files and decoy files known
as “honeypots”) to lure attackers away from the assets
he or she most wishes to defend.48 Table 4 shows the
timing of event differences between nuclear and cyberconflicts.
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Nuclear
Events

Beginning
of event

End of event

Properties

Cyber

• May be one-off.
• Brinksmanship moment.
• Declared, obvious—takes
place in real time, with real
time reactions.
• May “win through intimidation” through convincing
attacker to back down BEFORE he or she attacks.
• Obvious: one side backs
down and is declared the
loser.
• Deterrence can create
stability.
• Weapons’ utility remains
relatively constant.

• May be iterated, ongoing.
• May not be obvious until
event has already begun or
even finished.
• Defender may be reacting to
an ongoing event.
• Non-obvious: defender may
still not be aware that event
has occurred, or may not
be able to identify his or her
opponent yet.
• Weapons’ effectiveness
decays quickly.
• Tendency toward crisis
instability, “striking while the
iron is hot.”

Table 4. Time in Nuclear and Cyber-Conflict.
The fact that conflict is ongoing—often between the
same adversaries, occurring along a spectrum where
there is no clear end point, beginning point, or brinksmanship moment—has implications for the way we
think about the payoffs or rewards that cyberattackers
may gain or lose in cyber-conflict today. It also affects
how we think about the costs associated with participating in cyber-conflict and in preparing for it.
The Learning Problem: The Payoff of a
Failed Attack.
As the previous section has indicated, cyberattacks
might be more properly viewed as part of an ongoing campaign, rather than as individual attacks. This
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distinction is important, since the reward structure is
different for aggressors in a campaign than for aggressors within a specific conflict. The reward structure is
also different for defenders in a campaign. In considering cyber-deterrence, two important facts emerge.
First, deterrence in the cyber-realm is not iterative.
That is, deterring one attack does not increase your
chances at deterring subsequent attacks. Here again,
we can distinguish between a nuclear environment
in which a player might leverage a success in one interaction into successes in other areas or in future interactions. That is, in the nuclear arena for the United
States, prevailing publicly in an event like the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis created power and credibility
that could then be leveraged against future attacks.
The United States demonstrated resolve, which made
it look more threatening to others within the international system as well as toward the Soviet Union in
particular. However, because there is no brinksmanship moment in cyber-conflict today, it is theoretically
possible for a defender to beat an opponent’s planned
attacks and to gain nothing from having done so—because the less public nature of cyber-conflict means
there is no guarantee that anyone will know the deterrence occurred. In addition, there is no guarantee
that the next attack will resemble the first in any way
nor that the next attack will be committed by the same
actor.
Secondly, while deterrence is not iterative, cyberattacks are. That is, while the defender may win little
by successfully defending a target, the attacker may
win much more—even if he or she does not succeed in
obtaining the target, because of the nature of the ongoing campaign being waged. That is, when an adversary succeeds in hacking into a system, the odds are
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increased that he or she will subsequently be successful in infiltrating the same or similar systems—since
each attack provides more information about the adversary that can be used in preparing subsequent attacks. Succeeding once thus increases the odds that
the attacker will succeed again. Thus, paradoxically, a
failed attempt in cyberspace might not weaken one’s
opponent, but might instead strengthen him or her,
allowing the attacker to come back later and attempt
to attack a target again, equipped with increased
knowledge, new skills and perhaps even better outside support. (In contrast, “backing down” from a nuclear confrontation is seen as a failure, which confers
no benefit on the would-be aggressor, who may lose
prestige within the international community as his or
her reputation declines.) This way, even though a cyberattacker may be deterred, he or she may actually be
incentivized to wish to return and try a subsequent incursion, armed with the increased knowledge derived
from the first attempt.49 Current strategic thinking
about deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment does not allow for the possibility of one’s adversaries deriving a reward within a deterrence scenario,
especially when they fail.
This point—about the rewards of failed attempts
within the context of an ongoing campaign—can be
illustrated through considering the winter 2014 Chinese attacks against Anthem Inc., the U.S. healthcare
system. Here, Bill Gertz notes:
Stolen personal data likely will be used by Chinese intelligence services to identify, locate and recruit potential agents, especially those in the US government or
at defense contractors, or for conducting byer attacks
against specific high-value targets. . . . By sifting the
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stolen Anthem data for records on specific intelligence
targets, the Chinese stand to gain a further picture of
how to approach these targets.50

An article in Reuters similarly spoke of a “monthlong battle” with the group Deep Panda, also known
as Shell Crew, who is believed to have been active
since 2011. The author notes that the crew probed the
defenses of a U.S. company for 6 months before getting data, which were then used to set up a spearfishing account that company employees fell for, clicking
on a link that installed malware. These steps then allowed Deep Panda members to “move freely” along
the system for a period of 50 days. The author notes
that “for the next 50 days the group moved freely,
mapping the network and sending their findings back
to base.” They then returned 3 months later with specific lists of data they wanted, likely after consulting
with other experts.51 (Cilluffo et al. refer to such an
attempt as “preparing the battlefield” for a later assault through gathering intelligence.)52 Indeed, expert
Dmitri Alperovich has suggested that China is carrying out a campaign that has included the targeting of
state motor vehicle departments and U.S. Investigations Services, Inc. (USIS), a U.S. contractor conducting security clearance investigations.53 It has been suggested that perhaps all of the attacks may be part of a
larger plan aimed at creating a database of prominent
Americans.
However, for the defender, it is not always possible
to figure out how the attacks are related, and whether
an attack is simply a one-off event or part of a larger
campaign. (Here we may think again of Treverton’s
analogy of the mystery versus the puzzle.) In contrast, even in a situation where a would-be attacker
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appears to have “lost” by not accessing his or her
target, the attacker may have still “won” because of
gaining increased knowledge about the target, skills
at hacking, and perhaps acquiring an increased reputation within the hacking community based on how
successful the incursion was. Thus, the payoffs are
asymmetric and biased against the defender.
The Populist Problem: Nuclear Deterrence Is an
Elite Activity, While Cyber-Deterrence Is Not.
A final reason the nuclear deterrent example is not
a good model for thinking about cyber-deterrence is
the difference between the elite, specialized, and classified nature of nuclear deterrence activities and the
more populist and public nature of cyber-deterrence
activities. While one can speak of “public moments” in
nuclear deterrence, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis,
for the most part, nuclear deterrence has been a highly
specialized, elite activity. Those who work daily with
missiles are largely military personnel or contractors
holding high-level security clearances. Little public
attention is paid to their activities or to them.
In contrast, cyber-deterrence today may require
cooperation by all users of a technology. Just as U.S.
security officials have enlisted the cooperation of
American citizens in being vigilant against terrorism,
campaigns have also asked Americans to pay attention to their cybersecurity—from safeguarding their
personal information, to choosing good passwords
and being careful not to respond to phishing attempts.
The problem is that while deterrence for defensive
purposes appears to require the cooperation of all users, attacks do not. Instead, they may be carried out
by groups like Deep Panda without citizens on either
side being aware of them.
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III. WHY BORDER DETERRENCE THINKING
IS MORE APPLICABLE THAN NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE THINKING
As the previous examples have shown, the nuclear example is not an exact fit for those who wish
to “borrow” deterrence strategies and apply them in
cyberspace. Differences in the temporal frame, the
reward structure, and the elite versus populist strategies used suggest that applying the nuclear analogy
may be more confusing than helpful. In contrast, as
I have argued in Section I, a better example may be
drawn from the literature not on nuclear deterrence
but on criminal deterrence. In particular, the best way
to think about how to deter would-be aggressors in
cyberspace may be to borrow key tools and lessons
from the efforts of U.S. border security forces, which
have attempted to defend U.S. borders from authorized real attacks in real space.
There are several reasons the border security analogy more neatly tracks with the cyber-incursion situation. First, both types of borders are porous and difficult to guard. As Kelly Gable has written, the main
threats that exist in cyberspace come about because of
inherent weaknesses, which are built into the structure
of cyberspace and its technologies. Namely, it is leaky
or porous; has poor borders, which are not well defined and are nearly impossible to police. She writes:
The primary security threat posed by the internet is
caused by an inherent weakness in the TCP-IP protocol, which is the technology underlying the structure
of the internet and other similar networks. This underlying structure enables cyberterrorists to hack into
one system and use it as a springboard for jumping
onto any other network that is also based on the TCPIP protocol.54
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Clorinda Trujillo notes that a number of issues
complicate the problem of how best to guard cyberspace. The fact is, that the assets that make up cyberspace may be comprised of infrastructure and data belonging both to the government and to corporations.
In addition, the “borders” of cyberspace may be unclear, since assets belonging to one country (like data)
in reality may be housed in another country (which
may maintain and house the servers).55 Nonetheless,
since 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense has maintained a posture that would deny entrance to potential
aggressors who attempt to achieve objectives in U.S.
cyberspace. As noted in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review, the U.S. posture serves both to deter those who
would seek entrance to U.S. cyberspace, as well as to
persuade would-be interlopers not to make the effort,
as they are likely to fail.56 This way, the U.S. military
could be said to have already spent nearly 10 years
attempting to guard its borders in cyberspace. Thus, it
is possible to compare and contrast the efforts of U.S.
border patrols in both real space and cyberspace during that period.
1. A Variety of Actors Involved in Creating and Enforcing Deterrent Strategies.
We can also draw parallels between the variety of
actors involved in deterring border crossings in the
real and virtual worlds. In both cases, conflicts are created between a variety of different state actors on the
federal, state, and local levels. Although the responsibility for policing borders lies formally with the federal
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency,
in reality the responsibility for identifying those who
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have breached our borders may fall on state troopers,
local police, and even social services agencies acting
in a border area. Illegal immigration costs all of these
organizations money, and it is in the interests of all to
cooperate in implementing policies, which are drawn
on the federal level. Yet, in reality, with the problem
of sanctuary cities, all of these organizations may not
be on the same page in terms of border security. All
may not agree about the threat played by territorial
incursions or be willing to commit their resources to
address the problem. Some actors, like corporations,
may even benefit from illegal immigrant labor and
thus have no vested interest in committing resources
to combat the problem.57 Moreover, as with cybersecurity, the responsibility for coordinating the disparate responses and for making policy is at the federal
level. That is, both in virtual and in real border security, the lead is taken by the federal government, with
additional responsibilities being parceled out to other
actors at state and even local levels, including appropriate civilian and business authorities.58
Similarly, with incursions into cyberspace, U.S.
Cyber Command, under U.S. Strategic Command,
is responsible for defending Department of Defense
computer systems and conducting full-spectrum
military cyberspace operations.59 However, as Trujillo
points out, U.S. Cyber Command does not work alone
in defending American cyberspace. Instead, as she
notes, the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy speaks
of a requirement to detect and deter international
espionage efforts, which might involve using cybercapabilities. The main responsibility for combatting
such attempts is given not to the U.S. military, but
to those government agencies involved in enforcing
trade agreements—including the Department of Com-
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merce and the Department of Justice.60 This way, both
military and civilian agencies (including commercial
entities) and employees are asked to work together in
protecting the “borders” of cyberspace.
In both situations, there is a primary player (U.S.
Customs and U.S. Border Enforcement, or U.S. Cyber
Command), which is also backstopped by a number
of players with related missions. As Wayne Cornelius and Idean Salehyan point out, the deterrence
mechanisms placed around our nation’s borders are
multi-layered, including ships, planes, advanced
radar, and personnel.61
Lesson One: Both problems—deterring real and virtual
border crossings—require a complex set of deterrence
solutions.
These solutions must be choreographed by a wide
variety of actors, not all of whom are equally committed to allocating resources or solving the problem.
• In both cases, it is thus important to designate
a single point of contact who is responsible for
coordinating diverse efforts as well as exploring
what might be required to get “buy-in” from
all key actors. Thus, we have seen the appointment of a Policy Czar for Illegal Immigration as
well as a Special Assistant to the President and
Cybersecurity Coordinator.62
• In both cases, it is also important to define
terms and to make sure that all players share
understandings, as well as to define clearly the
sphere of responsibility. Defining terms and
spheres of responsibility is likely to be a point
of contention in both cases.
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2. A Variety of Different Types of Trespassers.
Next, in considering the “knowledge problem,”
the border incursion scenario more closely resembles
the cyber-situation than the nuclear scenario does. At
any given time, U.S. border control agencies must be
prepared to fend off an unknown and somewhat unpredictable number of possible trespassers in a poorly
defined information environment. Those who seek to
access America’s physical borders may include men,
women, and children; they could be career criminals,
starving refugees, or possible terrorists. The skills,
tools, and motives of the trespassers vary by status
and occupation and therefore, the same strategy for
preventing access may not work for each group.
Similarly, cyber-analysts have identified seven different types of “hackers” or intruders, including:
• Tool kits or newbies who may follow instructions found on bulletin boards to carry out
simple computer exploits;
• Cyberpunks, who may be interested in activities such as defacing web pages, often for political or ideological reasons;
• Internals, who may be disgruntled employees
working within an existing company’s computer department;
• Coders;
• Old Guard hackers, who may be interested in
the intellectual challenge of accessing a computer system;
• Professional criminals; and
• Cyberterrorists.63
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Siciliano offers a slightly different typology of possible
hackers and their motives, which are summarized as:
• White Hat Hackers, who may wish to test their
own company or other company’s systems in
the hopes of identifying weaknesses they will
then report to the companies;
• Black Hat Hackers, who usually work for money, hacking into systems illegally;
• Script Kiddies, who usually seek fame for their
exploits, often using borrowed programs;
• Hacktivists, who are often motivated by politics or religion;
• State-Sponsored Hackers;
• Spy hackers, who may be hired by corporations
and may sometimes act as moles, working in
corporations to get access; and,
• Cyberterrorists.64
Cilluffo et al. also point to a variety of types of adversaries, which the United States (or any nation) may
face in cyberspace—including foreign militaries, foreign intelligence and security services, nonstate terrorist organizations, nonstate criminal enterprises,
and hybrid aspects (such as one actor acting as a proxy
for another).65
The lesson here is clear: Both in real space and in
cyberspace, border crossing is an activity practiced by
different types of people with varying levels of commitment to achieving their target. Some are ranked
as amateurs, while some are professionals. Some are
primarily motivated by benign reasons, while others
are not. Some percentages in each group are terrorists.
As John Mowchan points out in reference to the cyberproblem:
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Non-state actors include hackers, hacktivists, terrorists and organized crime groups. Hackers are thrillseeking individuals. . . . while hacktivists use cyberspace to protest or promote their political beliefs. Both
usually don’t possess the technical skills to attack effectively government networks; however, state actors,
seeking to avoid attribution, could provide them with
the necessary tools to degrade or damage U.S. government networks.66

In each case, planners need to design different deterrence strategies for different groups who may have
different motivations and different levels of commitment to achieve their objectives. Unfortunately, as
Scott Helfstein et al. point out in their study of nuclear
terrorists, a paradox exists: Those who are most likely to be deterred from their objectives by a show of
force on behalf of the defender are probably the least
dangerous and least committed intruders. In contrast,
those who are least likely to be deterred are likely to
be well-resourced (possibly state-sponsored); they
may also have a higher level of ideological commitment to the achievement of their objectives. Indeed,
it is possible that those that are strongly ideologically
committed to an action will be incapable of being deterred—since their motivations are fundamentally
less rational.67
Douglas Tippett again argues in favor of a targeted
deterrence strategy, noting that a deterrent strategy is
seen as less credible if retaliatory threats are not appropriate to the actions being threatened. Although he
is speaking about our U.S. anti-terrorism strategy, his
point still holds. He argues that “policy threats lack
credibility because the signaled response to terrorism
holds constant across varying degrees of attack severity.”68 He suggests that those who consider and plan
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attacks are rational actors who think through the possible costs and benefits, as well as the risks. If, however, we accept that there are different types of actors
making these calculations, we might also conclude
that they will not all arrive at the same answer or use
the same calculus in thinking about risk.
The Threat Resides Both Outside and Within our Borders.
In addition, both those concerned with border security and those concerned with virtual security must
consider not only those who wish to access the system but also those who are already in the system. For
both in real space and virtual space, trespassers have
the ability to reside within the system undetected
for a long period of time. Accounts of the December
2014 Sony hack point to the fact that a number of attempts were made by the hackers to trespass into the
system. Hackers did not simply visit the site once but
also “moved in,” succeeding in mapping out drives
and becoming familiar with the contents of the servers
before deciding how best to attack them and what to
release. Paul Roberts refers to “low and slow” attacks,
in which people evaded notice and were in the system for a long time; he suggests that both the attack
against Saudi Aramco and Sony fit this pattern.69
In addition, in both border security and cybersecurity situations, “insiders” who are already within the
system and who may possess information and intelligence, which can be shared with would-be intruders in order to increase their efficacy and chances of
success, may aid those who seek to access the system.
Analyses of the cyberattacks on Russia’s banking sector, which took place between 2013 and 2015, point
to the fact that the employees within the organiza-
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tions targeted most often provide the “way in” to the
targeted systems.70 Employees may unknowingly assist those attempting to access their systems through
downloading malware onto their own computers as a
result of opening e-mails and files, or they may consciously agree to work with hackers attempting to
access a system.
Thus, it is obvious that in both situations, it is important to consider the whole process or life cycle of
incursions. In describing how hackers can come to own
a system, analysts often refer to the so-called “cyberexploitation life cycle.” The cycle includes eight steps:
• Initial reconnaissance (which includes both target selection and target research, or “profiling”
one’s target);
• Penetration;
• Gaining a foothold;
• Appropriating privileges;
• Internal reconnaissance;
• Maintaining presence;
• Exfiltration; and,
• Accomplishment of the mission.
Dimitar Kostadinov thus describes cyber-exploitation
as “an evolving occurrence which . . . has an inception,
development, main activity/culmination, outcome,
and eventually consequences.” 71
In considering deterrence strategies then, we
should differentiate strategies depending on the nature of the attacker and the point in the life cycle at
which activities are occurring. Just as the majority
of those who seek to enter the United States illegally do not ultimately wish to harm the United States,
some individuals who hack into computer systems
illegally may not have malicious motives in doing
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so. The same deterrent strategies will not work for
all subgroups of “trespassers”; it is thus imperative
for those designing deterrent strategies to figure out
whom they wish to deter, and then to design strategies aimed at those groups in particular. Here again,
a lesson may be drawn from U.S. immigration policy
and law in recent years. Particularly under the Obama
administration, the decision has been not to “waste
resources” on people who are not “real criminals.”
Thus, the bulk of resources devoted toward combatting illegal immigration have been devoted to prosecuting and pursuing career criminals and those who
are more likely to harm the United States through actions such as terrorism. At the same time, the United
States has identified a low level of illegal immigration,
which it is willing to accept without devoting resources to pursuance and prosecution.
Lesson Two: We Need Targeted Strategies Against
Intruders.
• In developing a deterrence strategy for preventing cyber-intrusions, it is important for
planners to decide whom we most want to
deter and develop a nuanced response in terms
of deterrence by design, by denial, and by punishment.
• Leaders need to commit resources to stopping
attacks at all stages of the attack cycle, including taking deterrent measures against those
already within the system.
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3. We Have No Strong Norms Against Incursions.
Perhaps the most striking parallel with illegal immigration is the fact that in both cases, the U.S. Government has been unsuccessful in establishing a norm
that would lead would-be intruders to change their
preferences regarding the practice. (In contrast, Nye
argues that there is a strong norm established against
the use of nuclear weapons.72) Instead, as Cornelius
and Salehyan note, in the period since the early-1990s,
the U.S. Government has quadrupled its spending on
border security, but has not experienced a quadrupling
of its success in deterring illegal immigration. Instead,
they point out, it simply costs more today to capture
a would-be immigrant than it did in the 1990s—since
the hiring of agents has roughly kept pace with the
number of immigrants who now attempt to cross the
borders. However, the overall percentage of those
apprehended has stayed relatively constant.
As a result, in both immigration and cyber-literature, analysts argue for the necessity of defining a low
level of intrusion, which is seen as inevitable and acceptable though undesirable. They also argue for the
necessity of defining a “red line” or level of intrusions,
which would be regarded as unacceptable and therefore would receive some form of retaliation. In both
cases, there is an understanding that no method of
deterrence will be 100-percent effective. Presidential
Policy Directive-20 (PPD-20) also acknowledges this
problem, noting that:
The United States recognizes that network defense,
design, and management cannot mitigate all possible malicious cyber activity and reserves the right,
consistent with applicable law, to protect itself from
malicious cyber activity that threatens U.S. national
interests.73
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As a result, both in cyber-deterrence and border
security, officials have begun to distinguish between
the types of intruders who are most likely to make
attempts—creating targeted deterrence strategies, depending on the character of the intruder. However, the
decision of illegal immigration or to accept some low
level of cyber-intrusion is problematic, because it may
suggest in some way that these activities that occur
below that level are in actuality regarded as legitimate
or acceptable. Helfstein et al. made the same argument
in describing the various types of terrorist threats that
the United States may face and the different strategies
that might therefore be required. Here, they argue that
“by establishing a specific red line, a state runs the risk
of legitimizing the more moderate but still lethal kind
of terrorism to some degree.”74
Lesson Three: Accept the Impossibility of Establishing a
Norm Against Cyber-Intrusion.
Planners may wish to consider accepting some low
level of intrusions by those who are merely annoying
and not harmful.
4. We Are Fighting a Long War Against Illegal Immigration and Cyber-Incursions.
Next, the attempts by border authorities to preempt, prevent, and respond to border incursions have
the character of a campaign or “long war,” similar to
the campaigns of the U.S. Cyber Command today.
Over time, combatting illegal immigration can lead a
nation to exhaust itself economically and in terms of
manpower. Combatting illegal immigration also has
a constant opportunity cost, because funds must be
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spent on border security rather than on other community needs, such as the need for education or social
services.
Similarly, within the area of cyber-defense, Amir
Lupovici refers to a strategy of “serial deterrence.” He
argues that “Cyber-attacks are very likely to turn out
to be manageable primarily through applications of
serial deterrence, repeated harmful responses over an
extended period, to induce either temporary or eventually permanent suspensions of the most bothersome
attacks or attacks by the most obnoxious opponents.”75
As it relates to continual or serial deterrence against
illegal immigration, the strategy rests on an acknowledgement that the “enemy” will not be completely
defeated, although police organizations may seek to
infiltrate and destroy criminal elements associated
with people smuggling and human trafficking.
It is also important to recognize that in both the
immigration and the cyber examples, targets are often
not fungible. In other words, if would-be immigrants
are unable to enter the United States along its southern
border, it is doubtful that they would merely choose to
enter another country instead. Similarly, it is unlikely
that would-be entrants into American cyberspace
could be redeployed to other targets elsewhere. Thus,
if intruders are stopped at one entrance, they will not
abandon their quest for entry but will instead choose
other less well-guarded targets. They will also not
make a one-time attempt at each entrance, but rather
will return persistently, seeking new weaknesses and
points of entry, and new means of deception (such as
false papers or identifications, etc.)
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In both the cases of illegal immigration and attempted cyber-incursions, it becomes clear that attempts at incursion are both ongoing and periodic.
That is, the number of attacks are not constant over
time but rather occur in somewhat regular waves and
cycles, in response to specific events. In the case of illegal border crossings and illegal immigration, one
can identify scenarios in which a short-term vulnerability is identified, such as an unguarded outpost or
a new method of smuggling. In such a situation, one
can expect to see a wave of attempts until the receiving country identifies the vulnerability and closes it.
Similarly, cycles of cyber-conflict may arguably
be both predictable and predicted. Cyberattacks may
increase in number and intensity due to other events
occurring between rivals at the time, in which cyberattacks are merely part of the strategy utilized (i.e.,
Increases in cyberattacks between Russia and Georgia combined with conventional fighting between
rivals).76 They may also increase as a result of crisis
instability. The understanding is that a player may
wish to exploit a short-term advantage he or she has
over opponents and thus may be driven to launch
an attack before the window of vulnerability against
those opponents is closed. A case study of the Anunak
cyber-hacker group in Russia notes a similar “wave”
of attacks on the Russian banking sector. A new wave
of cyberweapons to be used for cyber-incursions was
developed, which was then used in a heavy series of
attacks throughout late-2014 until Russia’s banks became aware of the problem and sought to close the
security hole.77
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Lesson Four: Understand the Mindset of the Attacker and
the Nature of His Campaign.
• Accept that those who seek to enter cyberspace
are committed to this action. They will wage a
“campaign,” making multiple attempts to enter
the space.
• One set of barriers will be insufficient to counter
intruders, and no set of barriers or set of punishments will be sufficient to establish a norm
against trespassing or to change the calculus of
those contemplating action against the border
significantly. In short, the target is too valuable
and too desirable for the would-be intruders
simply to abandon attempts to access it.
• Accept that the United States and American
assets—both governmental and commercial—
will always be the target of cyberattacks.
5. The (In)Effectiveness of Using Publicity to
Communicate One’s Commitment to Deterrence.
It is widely acknowledged that a successful deterrence strategy often rests on the ability of the defender to communicate a policy clearly and explicitly to
those whom it is intended to deter. To that end, some
cyber-analysts have even voiced support for a policy
in which the United States would exercise great transparency in publicizing the capabilities of units such as
the U.S. Cyber Command. As Lupovici argues, such a
policy could help communicate U.S. resolve to defend
cyberspace. Toward that end, he even suggests revealing budgets, resources, and manpower dedicated to
the subject—to increase the credibility of the deterrent
message.78

45

However, in their study of Operation GATEKEEPER, an initiative launched in October 1994 under the
Clinton administration to deter illegal immigration in
the San Diego area, Cornelius and Salehyan found that
high-profile efforts at raising the perceived costs of illegal immigration do not always have the intended
effect. Operation GATEKEEPER included an increase
in the number of border patrol agents deployed, the
number of hours during which watch patrols were deployed, and in the numbers of apprehensions made.
This very public strategy was meant to increase the
visibility of border agents and cause would-be immigrants to reconsider the costs attached to their quest
and their likelihood of failure. The plan included the
construction of 70 miles of fencing along the border,
along with the addition of remote surveillance systems, infrared monitors, seismic sensors that detect
footsteps, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
At the same time, a database was constructed to track
repeat entrants and people smugglers.
The authors note the immigrants interviewed perceived that it was now much more difficult to cross
the borders, as well as more dangerous. Over half
were able to name someone who had died as a result
of an attempted crossing. However, the authors still
brand the deterrence attempt as a failure. Operation
GATEKEEPER and the earlier Operation HOLD THE
LINE in El Paso, Texas, were meant to preempt immigration attempts and not simply to capture more
would-be immigrants. The U.S. Government believed that would-be immigrants could be dissuaded
from attempting a crossing if they understood from
the beginning that they were likely to fail at their
attempts.
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However, the authors suggest that Operation
GATEKEEPER did not have the intended effects. In
particular, it appears that Operation GATEKEEPER
may have been effective in deterring “amateur immigrants” from attempting a border crossing, but
that it was less effective in deterring professionals,
including those involved in organized crime and human trafficking. As a result, they suggest, many more
families were simply driven into the arms of human
traffickers, whose expertise they now relied on in a
more risky and dangerous immigration environment.
Smugglers meanwhile saw an increase in their business, along with the ability to charge higher fees for
their services.79
Similarly, Clement Guitton questions whether
high-profile attempts to “go after” hackers will be successful. He notes that while publicizing a campaign
of increased penalties and enforcement may have the
effect of reducing the number of attacks on systems by
35 percent, at least in the short term, many companies
do not want to participate in such publicity campaigns
because they fear the effects on their investors after
admitting that their companies have been the targets
of hackers.80 In addition, raising the legal penalties,
including fines and jail time, for those caught attempting to hack in, might discourage those hackers who
are largely hobbyists, but such disincentives might
not have the same effect on those who are hacking on
behalf of foreign governments, including foreign militaries and intelligence operations.
Another striking parallel between the immigration
and cyber-examples is the fact that in both cases there
is a fair amount of confusion and misunderstanding regarding the legislation that currently seeks to
regulate and punish unauthorized intrusions—either
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because legislation does not exist for all situations or
because all players are not clear what the legislative
rules are. In both the cyber and immigration examples,
it is unclear under whose jurisdiction the intrusions
should be prosecuted. In the case of cyber-intrusions,
disputes have centered around whether attackers who
were found responsible should be tried in the country where they themselves were located while carrying out the violation, in the state from which the attack emanated (which might be a third party through
which traffic is being routed), or in the country where
the damage was actually inflicted—for example, upon
a computer located on Wall Street in New York. Thus,
it may be unclear what criminal penalties may apply.81
In addition, as Guitton points out, it is more difficult to deter an attack when hackers themselves may
be unclear regarding the legality of their actions. They
may not know that their trespass is illegal (or may
claim not to know). He notes that “deterrence occurs
when a potential offender refrains from or curtails
criminal activity because he or she perceives some
threat of a legal punishment for contrary behavior or
fears that punishment.” Therefore, the threat of punishment raises the potential attacker’s perception of
the costs of such conduct.82 However, attackers may
not fear punishment if they do not realize that these
actions are illegal. Similarly, in the spring and summer
of 2014, many families sent their unaccompanied children to the United States illegally because they misunderstood the terms of the amnesty that President
Obama had offered to U.S. children who had been in
the United States illegally for a longer period of time.
They sent their children to the United States, believing
that it was legal to do so.83 Here again, efforts at deterring such actions failed, largely because the signaling
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message was not clearly communicated to its target
nor understood.
In both cases, the United States is also constrained
because of its own commitments to uphold the U.S.
Constitution and respect the rule of law, even when
intruders do not. In combatting illegal immigration,
the United States is to some degree constrained by
its own laws and policies—including rules that allow
for the granting of citizenship to illegal children born
within our borders as well as the need to provide illegal citizens with healthcare, education, and other services and rights. Similarly, Paul Rosenzweig argues
that U.S. deterrence efforts are weakened due to the
requirement that the United States combat cyberattacks within the bounds of its own Constitution and
rules.
Lesson Five: Consider How Best to Communicate
Deterrent Policies but Recognize the Limitations
on Doing So.
• Consider that some audiences will be more
receptive to a deterrent message than others.
Consider who will be deterred as a result.
• Consider the costs of transparency and whether
the risks of transparency outweigh the reward
of deterring potential attackers.
• Work with all partners to develop clear penalties for would-be intruders and to resolve
issues of jurisdiction.
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6. The Problem of Asymmetric Payoffs: Intruders
Have Little Incentive Not to Try Again.
Like the cyber-deterrence problem, the border incursion problem rests on a system of uneven rewards.
In both situations, those who seek to trespass or access
a system are often multiple offenders who learn something each time they make an attempt, whether or not
they are successful. An attempt thus costs little while
promising a reward with either success or failure. The
penalty for would-be immigrants who are caught is
usually a bus ride to the U.S. border, from which they
may again commence attempts to access the United
States. It is thus not surprising that in both situations,
individuals make multiple access attempts. The reward system is thus asymmetric between intruders
and those who seek to defend a space.84
Thus, as Espenshade points out based on his study
of undocumented immigrants in the United States,
when a would-be immigrant may be unsuccessful at
traversing a border at one point, he or she will seldom
abandon those efforts. Instead, the would-be immigrant will simply change tactics and targets.85 Thus,
the would-be immigrant might, for example, “up the
ante” by hiring a professional coyote to assist him or
herself and family with the border crossing if he or
she is unable to carry out these plans independently.
Here, we can draw a parallel between the foreign
government and corporation that outsources hacking through purchasing the services of mercenary
hackers. Espenshade notes that:
Among questionnaires administered. . . . The number
of attempts was always one greater than the number of
apprehensions; That is, all migrants simply tried until
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they succeeded. Apprehended or not, every migrant
who attempted to enter the US eventually got in.86

Espenshade notes as well that the would-be immigrant might also choose a different point at which
to attempt a border crossing—for example, to flee
through a rural desert area rather than along a main
route.
In the language of deterrence, the choice to find
a different path for achieving a target is referred to
as “designing around” a particular state’s deterrence
policies.87 One can quote Thomas Schelling’s finding
that “if deterrence fails it is usually because someone
thought he saw an ‘option’ that the American government had failed to dispose of, that it hadn’t closed.”88
In both the border security and the computer security scenario, one can thus see that deterrence strategies often fail because, as Jervis notes,89 a state often
tries to deter others from taking specific actions rather
than attempting to deter all actions aimed at a specific
objective. As a result, the state’s opponent can figure
out how to “go around” barriers to realize the objective. Case studies in criminology often reveal a failure
of imagination on the part of would-be deterrers. They
simply cannot think of all the possible ways open to
the other person to change the status quo—even ways
that in retrospect seem obvious.
As Sarah Bohn and Todd Pugatch argue, states that
engage in large-scale deterrence initiatives, such as
hiring an extra 1,000 police officers to engage in border
patrol activities, may end up simply transferring the
problem to their neighboring states, who become the
new targets. That is, deterrence strategies may make
sense for one locality, but they do not eliminate the
problem—they simply transfer it to a new location.90
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Thus, any attempt to deter incursions at one point
along America’s borders may succeed in the short
run, but it will not fundamentally solve the problem
of ending illegal immigration, since it is impossible
for the United States to devote the same amount of
resources to watching every point along America’s
borders with the same degree of scrutiny.
Lesson Six: Understand the Mindset of Attackers,
Including How They Think About Reward and Risk.
• Know that attackers may work together in formal or informal coalitions to share information
about weaknesses, and undefended borders.
• Realize that if intruders are “deported” or
kicked out of the system, they will not merely
return home, but will instead attempt re-entry.
Some will succeed in gaining entry but will not
immediately reveal themselves as intruders.
Instead, they may seek to assimilate or hide
within the system, in some cases behaving as
legal entrants for a period of time. (In the case
of cyber-intruders, they later reveal zero-day
exploits.)
• Consider how to establish mechanisms that
would penalize would-be intruders—and their
“sponsors”—for failed attempts, thereby raising the costs of an attempt. How much might
U.S. defensive measures cost to would-be intruders—either in terms of damage to their
physical equipment or their professional reputations? Perhaps the United States could establish a database of cybercriminals and implement
penalties such as denying student visas (or all
visas) to suspected cybercriminals. Could the
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judicial system treat trafficking in code similarly to drug trafficking? Perhaps credentialing
agencies, which vouch for a computer expert’s
knowledge and skills, could “disbar” suspected
cybercriminals in the same way that physicians
or lawyers could lose their licenses for unethical
behavior. Could an attempt to enter a system
be met with some form of physical response,
which would destroy the hacker’s equipment,
costing him resources and time? There are opportunities here if we are able think creatively!
7. We Need a Strategy and Not Merely a Set of
Tactics.
The final lesson for cyber-deterrence that we can
derive from an analysis of border deterrence is that
what is needed is a long-range, nuanced strategy—
which takes into account the causes of the problem,
the motives of the sponsoring country and the economic and political factors that act in concert with
the specific problem. That is, what is needed—both
in the cyber-realm and in the actual border security
realm—is not merely a set of tactics to respond to
particular incursions. As Cilluffo et al. have noted,
planners need to fight the tendency to craft a deterrent or defense strategy that is incident-driven or
ad hoc, marshalling resources only to respond to
particular incursions without considering the big
picture.91
Those who study border security speak of two
types of factors that create illegal immigration: Push
factors refer to events or incidents in the sending
country, which make it an undesirable place; while
pull factors refer to the factors that make the United
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States so attractive a target for would-be immigrants.
This paradigm acknowledges the reality that those
who seek to evade border security do not come from
nowhere and that in many instances the sending
country may be complicit in producing the stream of
illegal immigrants. Thus, a strategy for reducing the
problem would hold the sending country responsible,
as well as working cooperatively with that country to
reduce the factors that produce the immigrant stream.
In some instances, when a nation is felt to be complicit
in allowing illegal immigration to a neighboring country, it may be necessary for the receiving country to
sanction or punish the sending country until it takes
responsibility for the problem.
The border security literature is also helpful in
suggesting that illegal immigration might be thought
of as a symptom, rather than the problem itself.92 In
particular, the need for individuals to traverse borders
to secure gainful employment suggests a market failure, since employees are not available in the locations
where they are needed, and jobs are not available in
other regions. Again, what is needed is a comprehensive, international, long-term strategy for addressing
that market failure or overabundance of employees in
one region. A truly comprehensive strategy for deterring illegal immigration to the United States would
necessitate a working relationship between the U.S.
and Mexican governments to provide economic opportunities for Mexican citizens within Mexico itself,
as well as pressuring the Mexican government to
provide better healthcare and education and fewer
human rights abuses.
Similarly, a comprehensive cyber-deterrence strategy would necessitate identifying the nations that are
likely producers of the majority of cyberattackers, and
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it would require that the U.S. Government sit down
with its counterparts to consider the motivations of
cyberattackers as well as the complicity of the sending
state. Here, sticks and carrots could be used to forge
a more cooperative relationship with the sending nation. That is, one could also rely on the proposed cyber-strategy of “entanglement” to create structures in
which both the target and the producer of the cyberattack are affected by the damages that have been created and in which both have an incentive to cooperate
so as to not produce further attacks.93
Lesson Seven: Recognize That Cyberattacks Do Not
Arise in Isolation and Cannot Be Solved in Isolation.
Work to develop deterrent strategies that take this
perspective into account.
• Recognize that cybersecurity, like immigration, needs to be addressed as part of a broader
conglomeration of issues. As Rosenzweig has
noted, cybersecurity should not be addressed
only on a military level through military-tomilitary actions; it needs to be considered
within a broader constellation of national and
international issues (including economic competitiveness, etc.).94
• Recognize as well the importance and flexibility provided through a policy that allows the
United States to respond to cyberattacks not
only with cyberweapons but also with other
means—such as economic or political ones.
This policy is referenced in the 2011 U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace.95
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CONCLUSIONS
As this Letort Paper has shown, it is too simplistic
to merely map the existing nuclear deterrence literature in talking about deterrence in cyberspace. Cyberspace has many unique facets, as does cyber-conflict,
that do not exactly line up with the issues, assumptions,
and strategies utilized by those engaged in nuclear
conflicts. Indeed, it may be that there are other analogies—such as the immigration analogy—that provide
a better fit for thinking through the best strategies for
deterring cyber-incursions. The immigration analogy
is particularly useful for exploring how would-be
intruders learn, how they think about the costs and
benefits of launching an incursion, and how they
would work together to share and draw up informed
strategies. As noted, this analogy also helps those
seeking to defend a border or target to understand
the importance of working together so that targets are
effectively shut down rather than merely shifted. Finally, this analogy is important in considering the longterm nature of cyber-defense and the ways in which
one must address the underlying structural factors,
which both create the problem and, hopefully, contain
its solution.
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